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SOME RELIGIOUSLY DEVOUT JUSTICES:
HISTORICAL NOTES AND COMMENTS
THOMAS C. BERG* AND WILLIAM G. Ross**
For the last couple of years, we have been researching the religious
beliefs and activities of justices of the U.S. Supreme Court and how
those may have related to their judicial decision-making. The volumi-
nous literature on the Court contains almost nothing on this topic; and
we were intrigued by Judge Noonan's comment, in his casebook, that
"[t]he religious views of the Justices are a taboo subject in legal analy-
sis."' In an article criticizing the Court's free exercise rulings, Douglas
Laycock wrote that "the personal religiosity of the justices [is] none of
my business. They are protected by both the Free Exercise Clause and
the Test Oath Clause.",2 The warning appears to be that the justices' re-
ligious beliefs are private matters, not relevant or appropriate for schol-
arly discussion.' In the face of such statements, writing on this topic
makes us feel a little like reporters for the National Enquirer. Headline:
"Flash-Justice O'Connor Spotted Attending Church Last Sunday!
What does this mean for her off-again, on-again relationship with the
Lemon test?"
There are some good reasons why the justices' religious beliefs have
not been the object of study. Unless a decision of the Court makes spe-
cific use of religious arguments, which does not happen often, it can be
very speculative to draw a connection between the decision and the re-
* Professor of law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University.
** Professor of law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University. The authors ap-
preciate the insights and comments of John Garvey, Gordon Hylton, Sanford Levinson,
Christopher Wolfe, and other participants in the Marquette University Law School confer-
ence on Religion and the Judicial Process. Thanks also to Martin Marty, to our colleagues
David Langum, Trisha Olson, David Smolin, and George Wright, and to the participants in
the Cumberland Colloquium on Law and Religion, and Culture for helpful comments on
previous drafts; and to Christy Prickett and James Johnston for valuable research assistance.
1. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE BELIEVER AND THE POWERS THAT ARE 238
(1987). See also William G. Ross, The Religion of the U.S. Supreme Court Justices, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND RELIGION (Paul Finkelman ed.) (forthcoming 1999).
2. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. Cr. REV. 1, 23.
3. That appears to be Judge Noonan's warning too, although he tried to break the
taboo. See NOONAN, supra note 1, at 239. In his casebook, many of the excerpted opinions
are prefaced with information about the religious beliefs of the justices who decided the
cases.
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ligious views of the justices. Even if the legal realists were right that de-
cisions usually rest on factors other than legal doctrines, the justices' re-
ligious beliefs may be less important than are considerations of political
opinion, social class, or geographical background. Or religion may be
intertwined with these factors in ways that are difficult to sort out.
Moreover, the justices' religious views are often difficult to ascertain.
Denominational affiliations alone explain very little, and not only
among Protestants: just try to find jurisprudential similarities among the
Roman Catholic justices Brennan, Scalia, and Kennedy. One must look
to the specific views of individual justices-if they have left any record
of such views, and many have not.
Nevertheless, we think this topic is worth exploring not so much be-
cause it gives clear explanations for many decisions, but because it
sheds light on some important subjects such as the historical develop-
ment of American religions and their relationship to American politics
and law. It also is relevant to a question of legal philosophy on which
several speakers at this conference are experts: to what extent may a
judge bring religious precepts to bear in deciding cases?4 Many Su-
preme Court justices have in fact had a lively interest in religious mat-
ters, and some have been quite prominent in their respective faiths. In-
terest in the justices' religious beliefs flared up again recently because
the Court now for the first time has a majority of non-Protestants-
because of Justice Thomas's recent, publicized conversion to Roman
Catholicism-and because some justices, especially Scalia and Thomas,
have been unusually outspoken about their devotion.5
There are many entry points into this topic. In this article, we seek
to give an overview of the issues by discussing some religiously devout
justices who have sat on the Court at various periods of the Court's his-
tory: the Gilded Age of the late nineteenth century, the New Deal and
the mid-twentieth century, and finally the current Court. We examine
how the devout justices' beliefs have related to their judicial approach
and decisions, and how such relationships have varied at different times
in history.
4. See KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 141-
50 (1995); Scott C. Idleman, Note, The Role of Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making,
68 IND. L.J. 433 (1993); see also Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 932 (1989).
5. See, e.g., Richard Carelli, Justices' Faith Could Play Role in Two Pivotal Deci-
sions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 26, 1997, at 32. On Thomas' conversion, see Larry Witham,
Thomas' Journey Leads Back to Rome, WASH. TIMES, June 8, 1996, at All; Tony Mauro,
After 28 Years, Thomas Reclaims Catholic Faith, U.S.A. TODAY, June 18, 1996, at 4A.
[Vol. 81:383
SOME RELIGIOUSLY DEVOUT JUSTICES
We use the term "devout" in a limited and perhaps controversial
way, to refer to justices who have been active in religious matters or
who have left a written record of being significantly influenced by re-
ligious ideas. (We do not, of course, mean to pass judgments on the jus-
tices' spiritual lives.) Such active or recorded involvement is not the
only way a person can be devout; and a justice could also be influenced
by her religious background without being devout in a conventional
sense (this seems particularly the case with the Jewish justices, on whom
there has already been some scholarly work6). But active involvement
is at least probative of a justice's religious commitment, especially of the
justice's belief that religious life is not simply limited to attendance at a
weekly worship service. Just as important, a justice's active, recorded
involvement in religious matters gives us some material with which to
make scholarly judgments.
I. THE GILDED AGE JUSTICES
Although the vast majority of the 108 justices who have sat on the
Court have been affiliated with some religion, for a great many it ap-
pears the affiliation has been nominal. It is not that these justices have
been anti-religious. They have not had very strong views on religion
one way or the other, and they have mostly valued it for the extent to
which it promotes ethical behavior and social order.
However, during the nineteenth century, a number of the most
prominent justices were quite active and outspoken in religious matters;
and this involvement reached its height during the Gilded Age, the pe-
riod from Reconstruction until the first decade of this century. While
sitting on the Court in the 1870s, the otherwise obscure Justice William
Strong served as president of an organization that sought to amend the
Constitution to include an acknowledgment of God and of Jesus Christ
"as the ruler of all nations, and his revealed will as the supreme law of
the land."7 The much more prominent Joseph Bradley wrote many arti-
cles on the Bible and comparative religion and was hailed at his death,
with some exaggeration, as "one of the most accomplished Biblical
scholars in the country."8 The first Justice Harlan served several times
6. See generally THE JEWISH JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT REVISITED:
BRANDEIS TO FORTAS (Jennifer M. Lowe ed., 1994); ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH
JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND (1988).
7. DANIEL G. STRONG, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE WILLIAM STRONG, 1808-1895:
JURISPRUDENCE, CHRISTIANITY AND REFORM 293-338 (Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State Uni-
versity, 1985) (discussing Strong's leadership of the National Reform Association).
8. Frank W. Hackett, Mr. Justice Bradley, in THE GREEN BAG, April 1892, 145,
1998]
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as vice-moderator of the northern Presbyterian denomination;9 his col-
league, Justice David Brewer, remarked only half-jokingly that Harlan
"goes to bed every night with one hand on the Constitution and the
other hand on the Bible."' And Brewer himself, who was born the son
of Congregationalist missionaries in Turkey, wrote in the Holy Trinity
Church decision in 1892 that "this is a Christian nation,"" and expanded
on and defended that claim a decade later in a series of lectures pub-
lished nationally. 12
This heavy involvement in religious ideas and affairs is hardly sur-
prising, for these were the climactic decades of the "de facto Protestant
establishment" in America, in which Christian language and references
pervaded both the culture and the law.'3 And one finds explicitly relig-
ious arguments in some of the Court's decisions from this period-
mostly, it should be noted, in opinions by the above-mentioned justices.
Some such arguments, as one would expect, are in cases directly in-
volving the relations between religion and government. Brewer made
his "Christian nation" assertion in the course of holding that a statute
prohibiting the importation of foreign workers was not meant to bar a
church from calling a man from England to be its rector. And in an
opinion by Bradley, the Court upheld federal confiscation of the Mor-
mon Church's property on the ground that the Mormon practice of po-
lygamy was a threat "to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization
which Christianity has produced in the western world.', 14 But outside
the church-state field, Bradley provided another famous example of ex-
plicitly religious argument when he concurred in rejecting Myra Brad-
well's petition to practice law on the same terms as men, on the ground
that "the law of the Creator" required that women not be diverted from
147.
9. See Loren P. Beth, John Marshall Harlan, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:
ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES 1798-1995 216,218-19 (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995).
10. Quoted in TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE
HARLAN viii (1995).
11. Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,471 (1892).
12. See generally DAVID J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN NATION
(1905).
13. On the de facto establishment, see MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN
AND THE WILDERNESS 11-12, 31, 98, 154 (1965); FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE
RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE: A CRITICAL STUDY OF RELIGION CLAUSE JU-
RISPRUDENCE (1995).
14. Late Corp. of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,
49 (1890). Similar references to Christian civilization appear in the earlier Mormon cases.
See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341, 344 (1890); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45
(1885); and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879).
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fulfilling "the noble and benign offices of wife and mother."' 5
How should we evaluate these explicit religious arguments, looking
back from the vantage point of a century later? To some extent, the
principles that contemporary scholars have developed for the
"appropriate" use of religion by decision-makers are anachronistic
when applied to the Gilded Age Court. Kent Greenawalt has suggested
that the optimal principles would allow more use of explicit religious
arguments in a religiously homogeneous society than in today's plural-
istic one;16 religious arguments in a religiously homogeneous society
could command a sort of moral consensus that they could not in a plu-
ralistic one. And though America was changing rapidly in the late
1800s, its population and culture were still much more pervasively and
self-consciously Christian than is the case today. Thus, in the Mormon
cases the Court unanimously viewed polygamy as a basic threat to
American civilization because it was a threat to Christian principles of
family structure. The Gilded Age justices saw the American legal and
constitutional order as very much in harmony with Christianity, and
they were willing to make explicit arguments to that effect.
Note, however, the limits on the importance of religious arguments.
First, such arguments do not appear as often as one might expect in an
age of pervasive Christianity: one can basically count them on two
hands. Second, in many cases the religious arguments produce rela-
tively restrained results. For example, Brewer's "Christian nation"
claim, although it was certainly triumphalist, was not as benighted as
confidently pronounce it today.' To a large extent, Brewer was stating
a sociological fact: that most Americans were Christians and that morals
and customs and therefore laws were based, at least in a general sense,
on Christian teachings. Moreover, the Holy Trinity opinion used the
argument as a means of determining congressional intent: given the
public respect for Christianity, Congress would not have meant to make
it a crime for a church to contract for the services of a foreign clergy-
man. 8 Once one interprets a statute according to underlying purpose
rather than express language, then it seems appropriate to investigate
the moral beliefs of the enacting body, including religious beliefs, if
those are relevant to the particular question of interpretation posed.
15. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130,141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring,
joined by Swayne and Field, JJ.).
16. GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 6.
17. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 717-18 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(calling Brewer's declaration "arrogant[ ]").
18. Church of Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 472.
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Even Professor Greenawalt, who is skeptical about the explicit use of
religious views in opinions, says they can serve as evidence of commu-
nity morality. 9
What is troubling today about the opinion is the exclusive reference
to Christianity as the religion of the nation, which raises the implication
that only Christian congregations would have their freedom respected.
But the opinion explicitly says that Congress would not have meant to
bar the calling of a rabbi either.20 Today Holy Trinity looks like a free
exercise case, and the result, protecting the church but also congrega-
tions of all faiths, seems plainly right under the "compelling interest"
test that arguably should govern free exercise issues.
Likewise, one could defend at least some of Justice Bradley's use of
religious arguments in Bradwell even under the principles set forth by
modern commentators such as Professor Greenawalt. (Not, of course,
that Bradley interpreted the tenets of Christianity correctly, just that it
was legitimate for him to look to them.) If we accept the proposition
that open-ended guarantees of substantive rights-like the Privilege or
Immunities Clause, which was at issue in Bradwell-should be inter-
preted by reference to societal traditions, then once again, one impor-
tant indicator of such traditions is the teaching of major religions.
Bradley grounded his conception of women's role partly in legal tradi-
tions, though also partly in a divine law apparently independent of tra-
dition: "[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized
a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of men and
women."2' The two merge, in fact, because "the founders of the com-
mon law" adopted the natural law principles about women's role.2
Thus, the use of tradition as a source of constitutional interpretation
could lead to considerable reliance on religious arguments, as exem-
plars of tradition. That tradition, of course, would be different today,
and would not countenance the legal exclusion of women from profes-
sions (nor would most religious arguments today). Tradition is not a
static thing. But when tradition is relevant, religious arguments are
19. GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 147. Professors Carter and Idleman go fur-
ther and say that if the justices ever go beyond text, history, or tradition and engage in inde-
pendent moral reasoning, religious morality is a legitimate independent source of argu-
ments-not just evidence of community morality. See Carter, supra note 4; Idleman, supra
note 4.
20. See Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 472.
21. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring,
joined by Swayne and Field, JJ.).
22. Id.
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relevant as parts of the tradition.'
Some of the nineteenth century uses of religious arguments, there-
fore, could be defended even in modem terms. On the other hand, a
critic might counter that Justices Brewer and Bradley were not re-
strained in their use of religion; their opinions could have appealed to
tradition for support without going further and making such aggressive
assertions of religious truth.
Brewer made a more attractive, though less well known, appeal to
religious conscience in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,24 one of the
"Chinese Exclusion Cases." Today Brewer is mostly ignored or else
vilified as a laissez-faire dinosaur,2 but he wrote a long series of power-
ful dissents from decisions allowing Congress to deport resident Chi-
nese aliens, or deny them reentry, with only minimal procedural protec-
tions.2 In the leading case, Fong Yue Ting, the Court permitted the
deportation of a Chinese laborer who had lived in America for fourteen
years because he did not have a certificate required by statute and be-
cause the only independent testimony of his residence came from an-
other Chinese alien, not from a "white witness" as the statute required.
Brewer set forth his argument that the statute violated due process
rights and then concluded by asking: "In view of this enactment of the
highest legislative body of the foremost Christian nation, may not the
thoughtful Chinese disciple of Confucius fairly ask, 'Why do they send
23. Perhaps the real problem with Justice Bradley's argument was that he read
the question of whether to classify women distinctively as a question under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. It seems much more appropriate to treat the question as one of equal
protection. And the Equal Protection Clause is probably a less appropriate provision on
which to use tradition-based arguments; unlike the clauses that seem to refer to an accepted
set of privileges or processes, it seems by its logic to override tradition in the name of the
value of equality. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note
on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161
(1988).
24. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
25. However, a revisionist school, more hospitable to him and to the Fuller Court
in general, has developed. See generally MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID BREWER: THE
LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (1994); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP
OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910 (1995); OWEN J. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-
1910 (1993); James A. Thomson, Swimming in the Air: Melville W. Fuller and the Supreme
Court 1888-1910 (Review Essay), 27 CUMB. L. REV. 139,151-56 (1996) (citing sources).
26. See United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905); United States v. Sing Tuck,
194 U.S. 161 (1904); Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538 (1895); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892);
Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891).
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missionaries here? ' ' 27
This is, as Owen Fiss has observed, a "truly memorable" summary
of the moral issues posed by the decision.2 But what would we think of
such an appeal today? Setting aside the "Christian nation" tag, the ba-
sic argument implicit in the question might still have some relevance
today: American churches and agencies still send thousands of mission-
aries overseas, and the credibility of their message of goodwill still
would be undercut if the American government mistreated foreigners.
But it is hard to imagine a justice today making Brewer's argument; it
would lack resonance and practical force. It rests on an assumption that
America's mission to the world includes the spread not only of democ-
racy and freedom, but also of Christianity. Today, only the first two
would figure in the official understanding of our mission, if we still think
in terms of mission at all.
However these explicitly religious arguments might be evaluated,
why were there not more of them in an age in which Christianity per-
vaded public culture? Several reasons seem plausible. First, in those
days the Court did not deal with many cases involving the "intimate"
cultural matters of family, education, and sexual conduct-the areas
with which American religions have tended to be most concerned. (A
review of state court judges may provide more case material, but few of
those judges have left accessible records of their own beliefs.)
Second, the convention of avoiding explicit religious arguments in
opinions, to which Professor Greenawalt has called attention,29 may
have operated among legal elites in the Gilded Age too, although obvi-
ously not in a strict way. Bradley's peroration on divine law in Brad-
well, "according to one contemporary newspaper, 'seemed to cause no
little amusement upon the Bench and on the Bar."' There had been
similar reactions thirty years earlier when the Court heard arguments
concerning the will of philanthropist Stephen Girard, who had left a be-
quest to establish a school for orphan boys but had insisted, in order to
avoid sectarian divisiveness, that clergy could not serve as instructors or
even visit the school." Daniel Webster, representing the challengers to
the will, drew huge crowds by portraying the bequest as an assault on
Christianity. Again, hardened court observers wrote that "Mr.
27. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 744 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
28. FISS, supra note 25, at 312.
29. GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 150.
30. Quoted in Jonathan Lurie, Mr. Justice Bradley, in ILLUSTRATED BIOG-
RAPHIES, supra note 9, at 201,204.
31. See Vidal v. Girard's Executioners, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
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Webster's sermon has created no small amusement among the members
of the Bar"; and Justice Story, who was himself a defender of public
Christianity but who wrote the opinion upholding the will, confided in
letters that the theological arguments had amused him and that
Webster's argument "seemed to me, altogether, an address to the
prejudices of the clergy."32
Another factor is that Christian morality (or a widely accepted ver-
sion of it) may have so pervaded legal doctrines in a general way that,
paradoxically, explicit references were seldom needed. For one thing,
the mainstream Protestantism of this period was highly non-doctrinal,
instrumental, and general-even among the vocal defenders of the faith
on the Supreme Court. For example, in his articles on religion, Joseph
Bradley expressed little interest in theological doctrines, even the di-
vinity of Christ; he found wisdom in all the great religions; and as his
opinion in the Mormon case suggested, he valued Christianity primarily
as "an instrument of moral elevation, civilization and refinement."33 In-
deed, the chief reason Bradley offered for retaining traditional dogmas
was not so much that they were true, but that the "the masses are too
little developed in moral perception and principle to make it safe to
abandon the artificial methods and sanctions by which order is main-
tained."'4 David Brewer, in his "Christian nation" lecture series, com-
mended Christianity almost exclusively on the ground that it had en-
riched the nation's moral life; indeed, like Bradley, he virtually defined
Christianity as moral elevation.
More specifically, the dominant religious ideals overlapped consid-
erably with those of the constitutional culture. An example is the rela-
tion between mainline Protestant thought and the constitutional doc-
trines of property and contract rights that came into full bloom on the
Gilded Age Court. As historians such as Sidney Fine and Henry May
have shown, the clergy of the middle-class Protestant churches preached
ideals of individualism and self-reliance that paralleled and reinforced
32. Quoted in 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 130, 132-33 (1928).
33. Joseph P. Bradley, The Bible (1875), in MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF
JOSEPH P. BRADLEY 370,370 (C. Bradley ed., 1901).
34. The Danger of Abrogating Religious Forms (undated), in BRADLEY, supra
note 33, at 405. Justice Bradley's remarks were echoed years later by the less conventionally
devout Hugo Black, who told his son that while some people "do good for the sake of it,"
others had "to be scared into doing the right thing" by organized religion: by being "given
blind hope [that] you['re] gonna find it better somewhere else by doing right on this earth."
HUGO BLACK, JR., MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 175 (1975).
35. See BREWER, supra note 12, at 82-83.
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the legal theories of economic liberty.36 The clergy also called for hu-
manitarian treatment of workers and for some reforms of business prac-
tices-but voluntarily, they said, in the spirit of Jesus, not through gov-
ernment coercion. These were not the only religious views on the
question of economic regulation, but they were the views overwhelm-
ingly held by middle- and upper-middle-class Protestants, which in-
cluded the justices. And even the Social Gospel movement, which
challenged the individualistic focus of Protestantism, did not at first go
beyond suggesting voluntary reforms through education and moral ex-
hortation.37
Paralleling the religious endorsement of reform within a general
laissez-faire structure, the Supreme Court struggled to permit regula-
tion of the growing power of industry in some limited spheres but also
marked out a broad area in which government could not interfere with
economic liberty (that is, with liberty in the negative sense, understood
as individual freedom from government action). For example, David
Brewer was the Court's most outspoken proponent of economic liberty,
and he said, in one of his many off-the-bench speeches, that intrusions
on property rights violated the Decalogue's commandments against
stealing and coveting. He also echoed the clergy in arguing that the
way of Jesus in matters of social reform was "not to fill the statutes with
prohibitions, but to reach the individual and strengthen his character."39
At the same time, Brewer wrote the decision in Muller v. Oregon40 up-
holding a maximum-hours law for women workers and allowing regula-
tion in the defined sphere of women's working conditions. And Harlan,
though he accepted the framework of economic liberties doctrine, was
willing to accept regulation for health reasons in cases like Lochner v.
New York.
41
Although these pronouncements paralleled and invoked the relig-
ious concepts of mainline Protestantism, for the most part the justices
had no need to appeal to such concepts directly. The religious en-
dorsement of both individualism and public morality was utterly consis-
36. See, e.g., SIDNEY FINE, LAISSEZ-FAIRE AND THE GENERAL WELFARE
STATE: A STUDY OF CONFLICT IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1865-1901, 117-25 (1956); HENRY
F. MAY, PROTESTANT CHURCHES AND INDUSTRIAL AMERICA (1949).
37. See FINE, supra note 36, at 179-80.
38. See David J. Brewer, The Movement of Coercion, Speech to New York State
Bar (1893), cited in BRODHEAD, supra note 25, at 118.
39. David J. Brewer, The Twentieth Century from Another Viewpoint (1899),
quoted in BRODHEAD, supra note 25, at 130.
40. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
41. 198 U.S. 45, 65-74 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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tent with the structure of the law: indeed, the mainstream religious
views had been both embedded in legal doctrine and in turn influenced
by it.42
Even within the general Protestant consensus, however, there were
some cases in which specific religious beliefs and experiences of the de-
vout justices appear to have contributed to their taking distinctive posi-
tions. For example, Brewer, who was born in Turkey to American mis-
sionaries, consistently voted to hold America to constitutional standards
of decency in its treatment of foreigners-not only of Chinese resident
aliens, as in the Fong Yue Ting dissent, but also of people in the over-
seas territories that America acquired in its imperialist period.43 In
Brewer's religions vision, America had a calling to bring both peace and
the Christian gospel to the developing world.4' Here we have an espe-
cially strong case for drawing a connection between religion and deci-
sionmaking: not only an explicit religious reference in an opinion (the
reference to missionary work in the Fong Yue Ting dissent), but a host
of off-the-bench speeches in which Brewer emphasized "the evils of im-
perialism, ... the duty of Christians to work for peace, [and] the Golden
Rule as the guiding principle in diplomacy."45
Some of Justice Harlan's strong moral stances also were probably
influenced by Christian principle, although the connection here is less
plain. Harlan led the wing of the Court, which Brewer joined, that be-
lieved that constitutional guarantees should extend to the people of the
overseas territories. He repeatedly argued that to leave Congress un-
constrained in the territories would "engraft upon our republican insti-
tutions a colonial system such as exists under monarchical govern-
ments."' That Harlan may have been influenced by religious concerns
is suggested by a speech on world missions that he made to the 1905
Presbyterian General Assembly, in which he reiterated that democracy
42. Whether religious ideas helped give rise to the laissez-faire theories of the late
1800s, or whether they simplified ratified positions congenial to the middle class, is a com-
plex question. For a discussion of the relation between religious movements and property
rights, see William W. Fisher III, Ideology, Religion, and the Constitutional Protection of Pri-
vate Property: 1760-1860, 39 EMORY L. 65,108-21 (1990).
43. See BRODHEAD, supra note 25, at 160-61.
44. See BREWER, supra note 12, at 91 (stating "the more universal the rule of
Christianity in the hearts of our people, the more certainly will [we] ever be the welcome
leader in movements for peace among the nations"); BRODHEAD, supra note 25, at 107
(tying Brewer's position to "his lifelong support" for Christian overseas missions; "decent
treatment of the Chinese in America would promote the missionary movement, both here
and in the Orient").
45. BRODHEAD, supra note 25, at 173.
46. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,380 (1901) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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and colonialism were incompatible and asserted that Americans should
instead "use our riches and our strength to spread the church of Christ
all over the world.,
47
Harlan's most famous stand, on the unconstitutionality of racial seg-
regation, is harder to attribute to religious beliefs in particular. Harlan
was a former slaveholder (though also a Unionist) who switched to the
Republican Party about 1867 and thereafter embraced the Reconstruc-
tion amendments with all the passion of a religious convert. As far as
we know, he did not express his position on race in explicitly religious
terms. However, Harlan's biographers do suggest, with unanimity, that
his commitment to Reconstruction was sealed by his work as a lawyer
representing the national Presbyterian Church against Kentucky con-
gregations that broke away because of the denomination's position on
slavery and secession and tried to take the church property with them. 
4
(One of these cases, which Harlan litigated up to the Supreme Court
and won, produced the landmark church-state decision of Watson v.
Jones 9.4 ) We might simply observe that for a deeply religious judge, re-
ligious beliefs and experiences are likely to be thoroughly intertwined
with legal, political, and social influences.
Overall, in the Gilded Age the devout justices tended to see a vir-
tual identity between the ideals of the legal and constitutional order on
one hand and of Christianity on the other. What Owen Fiss has said of
Justice Brewer applies more generally: they "did not draw sharp lines
between the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, Holy
Scripture, and The Wealth of Nations.50 So the justices did not seem to
regard it as illegitimate to use explicit religious arguments, but for vari-
ous reasons they did so only infrequently.
II. THE NEW DEAL COURT
For the next prominent justice who gives indication of having been
significantly influenced by religious ideas, we turn to the New Deal
Court of the 1940s. Frank Murphy was a Roman Catholic, though in
many ways an unconventional one; Judge Noonan calls him "somewhat
47. Quoted in YARBROUGH, supra note 10, at 209.
48. See LOREN P. BETH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: THE LAST WHIG JUSTICE
86 (1992); YARBROUGH, supra note 10, at 72-75; Alan F. Westin, Mr. Justice Harlan, in MR.
JUSTICE: BIOGRAPHICAL STUDIES OF TWELVE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 93, 103 (A.
Dunham & P. Kurland eds., 1964).
49. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
50. Owen M. Fiss, David J. Brewer: The Judge as Missionary, in THE FIELDS AND
THE LAW 53, 63 (P. Bergan et. al. Eds., 1986).
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anticlerical."'" During the Depression, as mayor of Detroit and then
governor of Michigan, Murphy pushed through New Deal-style relief
programs, strongly defended the rights of unions, and intervened ag-
gressively to stop violence and bring a peaceful resolution at the famous
1937 sit-down strike at General Motors. 52 Among the major influences
on his actions was the tradition of Catholic social thought stemming
from Pope Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical "Rerum Novarum," which criti-
cized free-market capitalism and endorsed trade unions and minimum-
wage laws. Murphy said he "always based my labor views on that En-
cyclical in large degree."5 3 He repeatedly defended New Deal-style
regulation as the means of taking Christian principles of charity and
concern for the downtrodden and applying them to the new social and
industrial order.
There can be little doubt that on the Court, Murphy sought to
translate these same moral and religious precepts into law. The leading
biography of the justice describes how after a tentative first couple of
terms, marked by a desire to return to politics, Murphy resolved to de-
fine his role on the Court as an evangelist for broad principles of free-
dom and equality: "What a supreme joy it is," he wrote in 1943, "to
have no other mission in life than to lift one's pen in defense of freedom
of conscience and security and equal justice to the inarticulate!"'
In pursuit of such goals, Murphy wrote a series of majority opinions
interpreting the guarantees of the federal minimum-wage statute
broadly, explicitly "discarding formalities" because "we are dealing with
human beings and with a statute that is intended to secure to them the
fruits of their toil and exertion., 55 And in the opinions for which he has
received the most credit, he refused to join the other FDR liberals in
upholding the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War I156
and the summary military trials of Japanese commanders after the war.'
51. NOONAN, supra note 1, at 239.
52. See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL
BIOGRAPHY 118-79 (1968).
53. Letter to Arthur Cuddihy, Feb. 13, 1947, Murphy Papers, Beckley Library,
University of Michigan, Box 45, Folder 45-32.
54. Quoted in HOWARD, supra note 52, at 299.
55. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 592
(1944); see also Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946); Jewell Ridge
Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167 United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161 (1945).
56. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
57. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); In re Homma, 327 U.S. 759 (1946).
Judge Noonan celebrates the Korematsu dissent in his elegant essay, The Catholic Justices of
the United States Supreme Court, 67 CATH. HIsT. REv. 369, 383-85 (1981) ("The message of
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In cases directly about religious life, Murphy defended individual
conscience to the hilt. In every Jehovah's Witness case from 1942 until
his death in 1949, he voted to uphold their right to preach and prosely-
tize-leading to the quip that if Murphy "were ever to be canonized, it
would be by the Jehovah's Witnesses." He was proud that he de-
fended the freedom of Witnesses to attack his own church vitupera-
tively.
Murphy's defense of religious freedom owed little to official Roman
Catholic doctrine and much to his distinctive religious sensibility. Be-
fore dissenting from the holding that child-labor laws could be used to
bar Witness children from passing out tracts with their parents,59 Mur-
phy wrote his law clerk that he wanted "to save all that can be saved for
the parent as against the state in the right to teach the religion to the
child"; then, apparently thinking about the ongoing controversies over
aid to Catholic schools, he added that the foregoing "might sound a lit-
tle Catholic but I assure you I have nothing in mind but liberty of relig-
ion in a country that was conceived as a sanctuary for oppressed peo-
ple."' ° And in the first Establishment Clause cases, Everson and
McCollum, Murphy joined Black's opinions endorsing a "wall of sepa-
ration between church and state." The decisions allowed a limited, but
only a limited, form of aid to parochial-school parents and struck down
efforts to release public school students from classes in order to attend
religious instruction in the school building.61 The latter decision was ve-
hemently criticized by the Catholic hierarchy, which both worried and
angered Murphy enough that he discreetly asked friends to write some
replies in his defense, and at least once wrote such a letter himself.6 2
Murphy's Religion Clause votes reflected an outlook on religion
that was shared by the even less conventionally devout Justices Black
and Douglas. In one of the few articles discussing the justices' religious
beliefs, Michael Smith made a convincing argument that these justices'
decisions in church-state cases are best explained by their personal atti-
tude toward religion: sympathetic to individual conscience but suspi-
Paul to the Galatians that there was no discrimination in the Lord found here a constitutional
counterpart in an American Catholic heart.").
58. John P. Roche, Mr. Justice Murphy, in MR. JUSITCE, supra note 48, at 281,
292.
59. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 176 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
60. Quoted in HOWARD, supra note 52, at 346-47.
61. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (permitting reimburse-
ment for bus transportation to and from school); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,
211 (1948) (invalidating release time).
62. HOWARD, supra note 52, at 452-53.
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cious of the social power of communal or organized religion.63 Without
going into Smith's argument in detail, we note that it provides a good
model for how to connect justices' beliefs with their decisions. He
traces the results these justices reached: strong protection of individual
conscience combined with strong limits on religion in the public schools
and on state aid to parochial schools. Then he correlates the results
with the justices' expressed personal views on religious matters: Black
distrusted the Roman Catholic Church and labeled proponents of paro-
chial aid as "powerful sectarian religious propagandists [seeking] domi-
nation and supremacy,"' and Douglas was an even more intense relig-
ious individualist who grew up resenting the establishment clergy and
who once described churches as "feeding at the public trough."
65
One further example of how Murphy's personal religious sensibility
affected his decisions was his dogged, mostly unsuccessful campaign to
limit prosecutions under the Mann Act to the white-slavery context and
63. Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup.
Cr. REV. 83, 105-10.
64. See BLACK, JR., supra note 34, at 104 (discussing the justice's attitude to Ca-
tholicism); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,251 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (attacking
proponents of parochial aid).
65. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 248-49 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that constitutional test of what is a religious belief should be broadened, but also
that Amish parents had no right to keep their teenagers out of school to preserve communal
religious traditions); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS
14-16, 109-11, 203-04 (1975) (discussing the establishment clergy); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
New York, 397 U.S. 664, 714 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (making the "public trough"
statement and arguing that tax exemptions for charities cannot constitutionally extend to
churches).
Michael Smith also discusses how Justice Frankfurter's views of religion influenced his
decisions, and here another sort of evidence of influence appears. See Smith, supra note 63,
at 110-12. Frankfurter was unsympathetic not only to actions by corporate religion
(especially in the area of education), but also to individual claims of conscience (as, for ex-
ample, in the flag-salute cases). See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that religious influences must be kept "strictly
apart" from public schools); West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing Jehovah's Witness children to ref-
use to salute flag would give "freedom from conformity to law because of religious dogma").
Frankfurter's overall attitude, if not precisely one of hostility to religious beliefs, was
one of great concern about their divisive effects on the secular unity of society. That conclu-
sion follows clearly from Frankfurter's opinions and letters, but it is also indicated by another
piece of evidence: his opinions applying the Establishment Clause in almost absolute fashion
cannot be squared with his general philosophy of judicial restraint. Compare McCollum, 333
U.S. at 255-56 (assuming without argument that the Establishment Clause applies to states,
and interpreting it strictly), with Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59-68 (1947)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (expressing reluctance to incorporate Bill of Rights to bind
states). When a justice's particular votes are inconsistent with his overall philosophy, one
looks for non-legal explanations, including the justice's views about religion.
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prevent the Act from being used more broadly to enforce conventional
standards of morality." Murphy's biographer notes that "[tihis effort...
led to endless jokes about his priestly sympathies for a sinful flock,
which the Justice himself enjoyed."67 As our colleague David Langum
has explained in his study of the Mann Act, Murphy
had a viewpoint more in accord with our contemporary under-
standings about the limitations of law to deal with issues of mo-
rality. Sexuality, or "sin" from Murphy's strong Roman Catholic
perspective, was as inevitable as life itself. Therefore, repression
could not be successful. As he once wrote in a private letter,
"Someone must speak for sinners and reality. The law is for
all.,,68
It is worth emphasizing again, however, that Murphy's personal view
here conflicted with the official position of the Church. In the church-
state cases as well as other contexts, then, Murphy had little problem
seeing the Constitution as embodying what he viewed as the most at-
tractive general principles of political morality. It is, of course, beyond
our topic to discuss whether this Dworkin-like way of reading the Con-
stitution69 is the best method of interpretation. But Murphy's approach
did cause him to be criticized, more than any of the New Deal justices,
for rejecting the disciplining influence of legal reasoning and for writing
his preferred moral beliefs into law. The wisecrack in Washington was
that "[tihe Supreme Court tempers justice with Murphy," and one
writer put the criticism vividly: Murphy assertedly "looked upon hal-
lowed juridical traditions as a drunk views a lamppost-as a means of
support rather than a source of light."70
Murphy's example, however, does not show that there is a strong
correlation between religious passion and a morality-based approach to
the Constitution. As we will discuss in the next section, the most self-
consciously devout justices on the current Court say emphatically that
66. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 24-29 (1946) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Act should not apply to consensual polygamy); United States v.
Beach, 324 U.S. 193 (1945) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S.
369 (1944).
67. HOWARD, supra note 52, at 341.
68. DAVID J. LANGUM, CROSSING OVER THE LINE: LEGISLATING MORALITY
AND THE MANN ACT 210 (1994). The Murphy quote is from a letter to John R. Watkins,
March 1, 1945, quoted in HOWARD, supra note 52, at 341.
69. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1995).
70. Sidney Fine, Frank Murphy, in ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, supra note 9, at
396, 398; Roche, supra note 58, at 281.
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moral reasoning is not a legitimate factor in interpretation.71
Moreover, despite the influence of moralizing on his decisions,
Murphy does not appear to have made explicitly Roman Catholic or
Christian arguments in any of his opinions, except in church-state cases
where he (like everyone else) had to discuss religious positions and cur-
rents. There may be two reasons for the lack of explicit religious refer-
ences. By the 1940s, the convention may have been that such argu-
ments were improper-perhaps because of an increasing religious
diversity in America, perhaps because by then a large part of Murphy's
audience of professional and intellectual elites had come to think that
religious arguments lacked any credibility. Certainly, the New Deal
Court's principle that government must remain wholly separate from
religion, set forth in 1947 in Everson v. Board of Education,2 at least
implies that legal and political decisions should not be based on relig-
ious arguments. (Indeed, we have found only one non-church-state case
where the mid-twentieth century Court relied on an explicit religious
argument, and there the Court simply quoted and followed Bradley's
Mormon Church opinion in holding that polygamy was an immoral
practice within the scope of the Mann Act.7 )
However, another likely reason for the lack of explicit religious ar-
guments is that for Murphy, as for the Gilded Age justices of the Prot-
estant establishment, Christian values were not just consistent with, but
virtually identical to, constitutional ideals of democracy and equality;
and so again there was no real need to invoke the religious values ex-
plicitly. In speeches as governor, Murphy stated that "[i]n the scheme
of democracy, as in the code of Christianity, all men are on a common
71. Moreover, although Sanford Levinson's taxonomy of "Protestant" and
"Catholic" approaches to constitutional interpretation and judicial power is quite suggestive,
we have not found any strong correlation between justices' actual religious faith and their
method of constitutional interpretation. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
27-53 (1988). Hugo Black is perhaps the best example of Levinson's categories, as Levinson
himself notes; Black, who grew up Southern Baptist in Alabama, championed a literalist ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation analogous to the Baptists' literalist approach to Scrip-
ture. ld at 31-32. Black was not himself a Biblical literalist (or even a practicing Baptist in
his years on the Court); he may have transferred his allegiance from the Bible to the Consti-
tution as a source of inerrant authority, and probably the best explanation is that the rural
Southern populism that held that the common man could understand the plain meaning of
the Bible also meant he could understand the Constitution. But other justices do not fit the
categories; for example, Justice Scalia is a devout Catholic but is rather "Protestant," in
Levinson's terms, in his emphasis on the authority of text.
72. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
73. See Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946) (quoting Late Corp. of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890)).
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level of dignity and importance";7 4 and he referred to Jesus as
that humble Carpenter of Nazareth who was the most perfect
friend of democracy the world has ever known because His prin-
ciples are the very heart and soul of the democratic way of life...
the most ardent advocate of the brotherhood of man, the most
compassionate friend of the lowly, the most perfect lover of jus-
tice and freedom.'
These opinions of Murphy's were not simply for public display; he ex-
pressed similar views in his private correspondence.
Thus, although his substantive positions differed from those of
David Brewer and the Gilded Age justices, Murphy followed their ex-
ample in equating his understandings of Christianity, of morality, and of
constitutional law-except that by the 1940s a justice did not express
the Christian ideals explicitly in opinions.
III. CURRENT JUSTICES AND THE CULTURE WARS
We have entered another period in which the religious makeup of
the Court is noteworthy.76 It is not only that the Court now has a ma-
jority of non-Protestants; as already mentioned, denominational affilia-
74. Frank Murphy, Democracy and Religious Freedom, Address at Yeshiva Col-
lege (Dec. 11, 1937) in Murphy Papers, Box 76, Item 77-32, at 69, 73-74.
75. Frank Murphy, Address to Jeffersonian Club (April 13, 1938) in Murphy Pa-
pers, Box 76, Item 77-32, at 83.
76. Between the New Deal and the current Court, perhaps the most religiously
active justice was Thurgood Marshall. During his tenure on the Second Circuit in the 1960s,
Marshall turned down most other engagements offered him but devoted a fair amount of
time to speaking at Episcopal meetings, sitting on denominational committees, and finally
serving as a delegate to the 1964 national convention in St. Louis. That meeting made head-
lines when a proposal to endorse peaceful civil disobedience against unjust laws was voted
down by the lay delegates, led by Southerners, and Marshall thereupon left the convention,
apparently in protest. The bishops of the church hastily adopted the proposal as a "position
paper" and notified Marshall of this. See, e.g., Margaret Frakes, Episcopal Dichotomy
(Editorial Correspondence), 81 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1391-92 (Nov. 11, 1964). Marshall
responded with some satisfaction and, in a private letter to one bishop, expressed "the need
for much work in the several diocese toward more liberal deputies appearing at our next
convention." Thurgood Marshall to Rev. George L. Cadigan, Nov. 12, 1964, Marshall Papers
(Library of Congress), Box 23, Folder 5. For further discussion, see MARK TUSHNET,
MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 180 (1997). Marshall's church activity after that seems to
have tapered off, probably because of his increased workload as Solicitor General and then
Supreme Court justice, but Professor Tushnet reports being told that Marshall continued to
attend services regularly while on the Court.
One hardly needs to look to religious values to explain Marshall's passion for civil rights;
but his involvement in the culturally prominent Episcopal Church may have strengthened (as
well as reflected) his belief that significant progress toward justice could be made through
the system.
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tion in itself is not much of an indicator. More important is the pres-
ence of two justices, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, who have
been relatively outspoken in proclaiming their faith and in discussing its
relation to other aspects of culture. In recent speeches, Justice Scalia
has defended traditional Christian doctrines (such as the belief in mira-
cles) against the scorn of the "worldly wise," has expressed his own per-
sonal support for pro-life policies on abortion, and has urged Roman
Catholic colleges to continue to uphold "a moral and virtuous lifestyle
that is increasingly different from the surrounding society." 77 Justice
Thomas's devotion to a conservative charismatic form of Christianity,
and how that faith sustained him in the face of Anita Hill's allegations,
is a central theme of the "inside" account of the Thomas confirmation
battle written by his sponsor Senator Danforth.8
The single most prominent conflict involving religion, politics, and
law in America at present is the so-called culture war between
"traditionalist" views and "progressive" views in areas such as educa-
tion, the family, and sexuality.79 Although we make the following sort
of statement with some trepidation, it does appear from their public
statements that the religious views of Justices Scalia and Thomas land
on the traditionalist side of this divide. And today's Court, unlike that
of the Gilded Age, is constantly enmeshed in the moral issues that are
the subject of the culture war: abortion, gay rights, euthanasia, religion
in education and public life, and so forth. Justice Scalia, indeed, is suffi-
ciently attuned to the idea of a culture war that he employed it to lead
off his angry dissent in the 1996 gay rights case, Romer v. Evans."
One distinctive feature of today's situation, though, is that even as
religio-political issues divide the Court more than ever, these two most
publicly devout justices are the strongest in forswearing reliance on re-
ligious or other personal moral beliefs in making decisions. Both Scalia
77. Joan Biskupic, Scalia Makes the Case for Christianity: Justice Proclaims Belief
in Miracles, WASH. POST, April 10, 1996, at Al (reporting a speech Scalia made at Christian
Legal Society prayer breakfast in Mississippi); Jeffrey Gold, Catholic Universities Neglect
Their Mission, Assoc. Press. Pol. Serv., March 6, 1997, 1997 WL 2506558 (speech at Seton
Hall University in New Jersey). Scalia's speeches have provoked widespread reaction over
whether a sitting justice should speak his mind about his religious faith; this reaction is itself
critiqued in Michael Stokes Paulsen and Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia's Sermonette, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 863 (1997).
78. See generally JOHN C. DANFORTH, RESURRECTION: THE CONFIRMATION OF
CLARENCE THOMAS (1994).
79. See generally JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE
TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991).
80. 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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and Thomas profess a strong commitment to what Professor Greenaw-
alt has called the "limited sources" approach to constitutional and statu-
tory interpretation: reliance only on the text, on original intent, or on
specific, clearly-established legal traditions.8' Both were questioned at
their confirmation hearings on their commitment to set aside personal
moral values in judging. The subtext, of course, was abortion; Scalia
had expressed reservations about Roe v. Wade, and Thomas had given
speeches suggesting that a religiously oriented form of "natural law"
should be a standard for judicial decisionmaking, in a way that implied
he too would overrule Roe. In response to questioning, Scalia affirmed
"that one of the primary qualifications for a judge is to set aside per-
sonal views," and that even if he thought certain laws were "immoral in
the results they produce ... [i]n no way would I let that influence my de-
termination of how they apply."' Thomas also pledged that he would
stick to the text and history, saying that natural law was merely "the
background to our Constitution," not "a method of interpreting or a
method of adjudicating in the constitutional law area.""
These answers were more than just confirmation conversions. Both
Scalia and Thomas have reembraced and reemphasized these restraints
in numerous opinions.' Unlike the devout justices of the Gilded Age,
and Murphy during the New Deal, Scalia and Thomas profess no great
harmony-indeed they profess a sharp distinction-between principles
of morality and of constitutional interpretation.
To be sure, the "limited sources" approach restricts the use of other
moral views in judicial decisionmaking just as much as it does religious
views. Under this approach, all moral arguments are illegitimate if they
are not tied to the specific history of the provision in question, or to so-
cietal traditions concerning the specific issue before the Court. And
Justices Scalia and Thomas frequently criticize the other members of
the Court, perhaps rightly so, for reading their own moral views into the
Constitution. As Professor Carter has pointed out, a devout religious
believer will certainly find it more acceptable to prohibit all free-
floating moral arguments than just to prohibit religious ones.85
81. GREENAWALT, supra note 4, at 141.
82. Quoted in Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil
Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1064 (1990).
83. Witham, supra note 5, at All.
84. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.).
85. Carter, supra note 4, at 933. Thus, in focusing on Justices Scalia and Thomas,
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Nevertheless, the "limited sources" approach is indeed a limit that
may raise problems for a devout justice. Does the commitment to set
aside religious precepts in rendering decisions (even if other personal
moral views are set aside as well) require a devout justice to shirk his
duties to God, to deny the all-encompassing nature of the religious
claim on his identity? Does it mean, at least in some cases, that the jus-
tice will be morally responsible for condoning or enforcing immoral
laws? Even if the ideal of following only limited sources were possible
to achieve, is it sufficiently attractive morally to serve as a grounding for
judges' behavior? These are very good questions that have been ex-
plored by Sanford Levinson and others."
Justice Scalia said at his confirmation hearings that if he faced an ir-
reconcilable conflict between his religious duties and his constitutional
duties, he would recuse himself or perhaps even resign." When Justice
Brennan was asked the same question, he essentially answered: "My re-
ligious beliefs have to give way."" Scalia's answer seems more theo-
logically appropriate for a devout believer to give, as Thomas Shaffer
has pointed out. 9 But though Justice Scalia is not blithely ready to
choose his job over his faith, as Justice Brennan apparently would, nev-
ertheless we can probably assume that the prospect of recusal in an im-
portant case (to say nothing of resignation) would cause any justice con-
siderable distress.
To date, however, these questions do not appear to have had serious
practical import for Justices Scalia or Thomas. In most of the issues
that have come before them involving religion-related conflicts, Scalia
and Thomas have reached constitutional results that, so far as we can
tell, are consistent with the views of traditionalist Christianity. They
reject abortion rights, homosexual rights, and the right to euthanasia
and favor permitting a greater role for majoritarian religion in public
we do not mean to imply that it is not worth investigating how other justices' personal beliefs
relate to their decisions. Nor do we mean to imply that some other views expressed in jus-
tices' opinions might be seen as "religious" in some broad sense. A crucial paragraph from
the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, for example, might be seen as expressing a
view that is functionally religious: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
86. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 82; Thomas L. Shaffer, On Checking the Arti-
facts of Canaan: A Comment on Levinson's "Confrontation," 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1133
(1990); Howard J. Vogel, The Judicial Oath and the American Creed, 39 DEPAUL L. REV.
1107 (1990).
87. See Levinson, supra note 82, at 1064.
88. Id. at 1063.
89. Id. at 1066 n.64.
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activities.'9 If state laws legalizing abortion or euthanasia were chal-
lenged in court, Scalia and Thomas might face conflicts between their
moral views and the results of their constitutional method; but no such
challenges have reached the Supreme Court.9' The only major cultural
and moral question on which these justices' constitutional results have
differed from the official moral teaching of the Roman Catholic Church
is the death penalty, which they vote to uphold and the Church in most
cases condemns. We will return to these latter cases shortly.
Let us set aside the simplistic accusation that these justices (or in-
deed any others) are hypocrites who use legal reasoning as a cover to
follow their moral views. 2 Why have the expressed religious views of
Scalia and Thomas largely harmonized with the results they have
reached as a matter of constitutional interpretation?
One reason is that under any theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion-no matter how "objective" it purports to be--one's application of
an accepted standard to particular facts will sometimes turn on how one
views the world personally, including religiously. In other words, the
finding of "constitutional facts" will sometimes turn on religious issues.
Again, Romer v. Evans provides an example.93 The majority struck
down Colorado's anti-gay-rights initiative, Amendment 2, on the
90. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) (majority opinion joined
by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Thomas, J.); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting, joined by Thomas, J.); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting, joined by Thomas, J.).
91. The Court's decree of a constitutional right to abortion obviously does away
with the need for state laws protecting abortion rights. On the question of euthanasia, a fed-
eral district court did hold that the legalization of physician-assisted suicide violates the equal
protection rights of terminally ill persons, but the ruling was vacated on justiciability
grounds. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), vacated, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th
Cir. 1997).
92. Like any other justices, Scalia and Thomas do show apparent inconsistencies;
it could be argued that at least at times, they vote their moral views like everyone else when
text or history point the other way. This explanation might find some support in their opin-
ions in the affirmative action cases, where they use rather free-floating language about the
immorality and counter-productivity of race-conscious programs. See City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Adarand Constructors Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239, (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). However, it would require ex-
tensive discussion about the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to
affirmative action programs in order to make the charge of inconsistency stick. But see Eric
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71
VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (arguing the Amendment's framers approved some kinds of affirma-
tive action programs).
93. We thank David Smolin for suggesting the aspect of "constitutional fact"-
finding in Romer, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
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ground that it failed rational-basis review: "its sheer breadth is so dis-
continuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but sheer animus toward" homosexuals.94 Jus-
tice Scalia and Thomas agreed that laws should not be motivated by ha-
tred of any class; but what the majority read as animus toward gay peo-
ple, Scalia and Thomas read as a measured expression of disapproval of
homosexual conduct.95 There are arguments to be made for either
reading. But the point here is that a justice's interpretation of key so-
cial facts, such as whether Amendment 2 reflected hatred of gays or not,
is bound to be affected by her religious views-and for less devout jus-
tices, by the views that they have about religion. Remember again the
effect that the views of Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy on religion
had on early modem church-state law.
More importantly, religious arguments play a role even in Scalia and
Thomas's "limited sources" approach because of their reliance on tradi-
tion as a key to constitutional interpretation, reflected both in substan-
tive due process cases96 and in other areas such as the First Amend-
ment. As we already discussed in part I, to the extent that tradition is
an important source of constitutional norms, resort to major religious
views in the culture is appropriate to determine the tradition. In so
doing, goes the argument, a justice is not looking to his personal relig-
ious views, but to those of society as a whole. Thus, if tradition is the
right standard for delineating the extent of the substantive due process
right of privacy, it was appropriate for Chief Justice Burger in Bowers v.
Hardwick" to look to traditional religious arguments in passing on the
asserted privacy right to engage in homosexual sodomy. When Burger
argued that "[c]ondemnation of [such] practices is firmly rooted in Ju-
daeo-Christian moral and ethical standards," he may or may not have
construed these religious traditions accurately;'O' but if societal tradi-
tions matter, he was justified in looking to the religious teachings.
To be sure, a justice's using religious arguments as exemplars or evi-
94. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
95. Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (opinion of
Scalia, J.).
97. See, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv. Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 2357-
61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (free speech); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (non-establishment).
98. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
99. Id. at 196 (Burger, J., concurring).
100. Idleman, supra note 4, at 480-81.
1998]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
dence of societal traditions is not the same thing as the justice's using
his own personal religious beliefs. Moreover, in his own substantive
due process opinions, Justice Scalia has not explicitly relied on religious
arguments; for example, in concurring in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department. of Health, he discussed the common law tradition that pro-
hibited suicide, without mentioning any traditional religious pro-
nouncements on the question."1 But even without the explicit refer-
ences to religion, a tradition-based analysis of what is constitutional
will, obviously, produce results consistent with traditionalist moral and
religious views. That may simply push the charges of hypocrisy back to
another level. Do Justices Scalia and Thomas follow a tradition-based
analysis because their personal views are largely consistent with tradi-
tionalist moral values? But again, such a charge would be unfair with-
out a great deal of further discussion, for there are legitimate reasons
for regarding tradition as a central factor in constitutional interpreta-
tion.'
But the most important component of Scalia's and Thomas's juris-
prudence that can head off conflicts between religious duties and consti-
tutional duties is their emphasis on the limited role of federal judges:
that they pass simply on the constitutionality of legislation, not on its
morality, and that it is the legislature and not the courts that bears
moral responsibility for the enactment of unjust legislation.
Justice Scalia has relied on this distinction in order to assume a posi-
tion of neutrality in the culture wars, even on issues on which tradition-
alist religious believers have very strong feelings. For example, in his
dissent from the reaffirmation of abortion rights in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, °3 Scalia strongly indicated that he would vote to uphold a pro-
choice law adopted by a state just as much as pro-life law, even though
some anti-abortion lawyers have argued that liberal abortion laws un-
constitutionally deny equal protection to unborn children. For Scalia,
the point is that the Constitution "says absolutely nothing about" abor-
101. 497 U.S. 261, 294-98 (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. The use of tradition in constitutional interpretation, it may colorably be as-
serted, allows the Constitution to adapt organically to the changing nature of the country,
without giving judges free reign to make that adaptation solely on their subjective judgment.
For Justice Scalia's defense of his particular method of using tradition, see, e.g., Northlake,
116 S. Ct. at 2357-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). Cf Michael A. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Con-
stitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 551, 565 (1985) (offering another, though
rather different, use of tradition). But see LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DoRF, ON
READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991) (critiquing Justice Scalia's approach).
103. 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting in part).
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tion. Likewise, in Romer, after excoriating the majority for reading
notions of sexual relativism and autonomy into the Constitution in
striking down the anti-gay-rights amendment, Scalia added: "I would
not myself indulge in [ ] official praise for heterosexual monogamy, be-
cause I think it no business of the courts (as opposed to the political
branches) to take sides in this culture war."10 5
104. Id. at 980.
105. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1637 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia expounded further on the impermissibility of judges relying on moral arguments-
even traditionalist ones-when he responded to some questions after a speech he gave at the
Gregorian University in Rome in May 1996. See Justice Scalia/Rome Address-Of Democ-
racy, Morality, and the Majority, Origins (Catholic News Service Documentary Service), June
27, 1996, at 81 (copy on file with authors and with Marquette Law Review). The gist of his
speech was that Christians should regard any political or economic system-democracy, so-
cialism, or capitalism-not as theologically mandated or as the means for achieving ultimate
goals, but as a more limited vehicle "for protecting life and property and assuring the condi-
tions for physical prosperity." Id. at 83-85. In answering questions about the relationship
between Christianity, democracy, and natural law, Justice Scalia reiterated his positivistic
conception of minority and constitutional rights:
The whole theory of democracy.., is that the majority rules; that is the whole the-
ory of it. You protect minorities only because the majority determines that there
are certain minorities or certain minority positions that deserve protection... The
minority loses, except to the extent that the majority, in its document of govern-
ance, has agreed to accord the minority rights. Otherwise you do not want a de-
mocracy, you want a king to decide what is right.
Id. at 88. This positivistic approach underlay his comment, echoing his opinions in Casey and
Romer, that "[i]f the people, for example, want abortion, the state should permit abortion in
a democracy. If the people do not want it, the state should be able to prohibit it as well." Id.
at 87. The role of Christian moral arguments, he suggested, was "to convert the democratic
society, which will then have its effect upon the government. But I don't know how you can
argue on the basis of democratic theory that the government has a moral obligation to do
something that is opposed by the people." Id.
Finally, Justice Scalia connected these thoughts to the role of the judge interpreting the
Constitution:
Maybe my very stingy view, my very parsimonious view, of the role of natural law
and Christianity in the governance of the state comes from the fact that I am a
judge, and it is my duty to apply the law. And I do not feel empowered to revoke
those laws that I do not consider good laws. If they are stupid laws, I apply them
anyway, unless they go so contrary to my conscience that I must resign... But I
would certainly not have the power to invalidate them because they are contrary to
the natural law. I have been appointed to apply the Constitution and positive law.
God applies the natural law .... I'm a worldly judge. I just do what the Constitu-
tion tells me to do.
Id. at 89-90.
Justice Scalia's comments provoked critical reaction from the Rome audience and from
commentators sympathetic to natural-law arguments. One line of criticism is that set forth
by Christopher Wolfe: that Justice Scalia needs "to distinguish more carefully what might be
called his 'judicial positivism' from a broader legal [or moral] positivism"-that the fact that
judges should confine themselves to positive law adopted by the majority does not entail the
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A somewhat less incendiary example of this position comes in the
Free Exercise Clause decision of Employment Division v. Smith,"°
where Scalia used his jurisprudential approach in the majority opinion
to produce a result-the elimination of most constitutional protection
for religious conduct from generally applicable laws-that is bound in
some cases to conflict with his expressed views off the bench on the re-
lation of religion to society. He has voiced concern for the increasing
pressure of secular society on a distinctive religious life; but the with-
drawal of any constitutional requirement for religious accommodations
is likely to help increase the secularizing pressures on religious bodies.
Specifically, Scalia has praised Roman Catholic colleges that march to a
different tune than society's, and he suggested that the student-funded
gay rights group at Georgetown had been "imposed upon [the univer-
sity] by a questionable court decree."1" However, Smith wiped out or at
least greatly weakened most of the arguments that Catholic colleges
could raise to question such impositions.' In today's culture wars, and
today's conditions of wide-ranging government, traditionalist values will
not always succeed in the political process, and they may be threatened
with suppression by law.
Justice Scalia's answer in Smith is that legislatures are free to protect
religious freedom by exempting religious conduct from generally appli-
cable laws." A corollary of that position, it would seem, is the assertion
that judges who simply defer to the government do not bear moral re-
sponsibility when religious freedom is suppressed by general laws. As
broader proposition "that what the majority does is right because the majority does it."
Christopher Wolfe, Some Religiously Devout Justices, Civil Religion, and the Culture War, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 427,439 (1998).
A second line of criticism was that Justice Scalia had failed to take into account the
natural-law origins of the American polity, reflected most clearly in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. See, e.g., Robert A. Connor, Justice Scalia and Yogi Berra: A Matter of Interpre-
tation, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 165 (1996); The Public Square, FIRST THINGS, January 1998, at 66
(summarizing Connor's article as arguing that "Justice Scalia may be right about a democ-
racy, .. . but not about this democracy").
We thank Richard Myers and Charles Haynes for assisting us in securing a copy of the
news-service transcription of Justice Scalia's remarks.
106. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
107. Gold, supra note 77, at 4.
108. It is interesting that Scalia described the Georgetown ruling as
"questionable," since the gay-rights ordinance that Georgetown was forced to abide by was
"generally applicable" and did not single out religion and therefore would arguably be con-
stitutional under his opinion in Smith. Perhaps the university could assert rights to relig-
iously motivated speech or association, which arguably survive Smith. See Smith, 494 U.S. at
881-82.
109. Id at 890.
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Scalia put it in reaffirming the Smith rule just this past term: "The is-
sue ... is, quite simply, whether the people, through their elected repre-
sentatives, or rather this Court, shall" determine when religious free-
dom has been unreasonably burdened. Smith determines that "[i]t shall
be the people."1 0
Surely the distinction between acting as a legislator and as a consti-
tutional interpreter is basic to our system; it is what makes the practice
of judicial review in a democratic republic theoretically defensible. In
particular, the justice who allows an immoral law to pass federal consti-
tutional review cannot be placed in the same category of moral respon-
sibility as the legislator who votes for the law. The justice indeed occu-
pies a more limited role than the legislator. Moreover, in functional
terms, a court acts with less consequence when it permits other
branches to enact an immoral law than when it strikes down a morally
necessary law passed by the other branches. It is easier to correct the
former action, since it can be done by ordinary legislation, whereas cor-
recting a constitutional decision usually requires an Article V amend-
ment or some large shift in the Court's makeup.
Not surprisingly, then, the two greatest moral conflicts that federal
judges have faced in American history both involved situations where
judges struck down laws and gave constitutional protection to behavior
that at least some of the judges (and at any rate large parts of society)
believed was deeply wrong. One was slavery, where as Robert Cover
discussed, anti-slavery judges struck down state laws that would have
made it harder for slaveholders to recapture escaped slaves."' The
other case is abortion, in which Catholic justices, Brennan and Ken-
nedy, have voted to adopt rules that prevent states from prohibiting
what the Church regards as murder.
For reasons such as those given above, John Garvey and Amy
Coney, in their interesting and careful contribution to this conference,
conclude that a Catholic judge who affirms death sentences on appellate
review or in habeas corpus proceedings does not commit an intrinsically
wrong act under principles of Catholic social teaching, notwithstanding
the Church's official view that the death penalty is immoral in most cir-
cumstances."' The judge's role on appeal or habeas-the only situa-
110. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2176 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part).
111. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
112. John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 303, 316, 318-19 (1998).
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tions in which a Supreme Court justice will confront the death pen-
alty-is limited to correcting legal errors, perhaps only constitutional
errors if the judge sits in habeas review of state sentences. The judge is
not, in terms of Catholic social teaching, committing the evil act himself.
Nor is he "formally cooperating" with evil by intending to bring about
the result of death; the judge's intent is to apply the Constitution, and
executions are simply an unintended consequence.
But as Garvey and Coney also point out, even a judge who does not
directly commit an evil act or intend to bring it about can be guilty of
"material cooperation" with the wrongdoer. Citing various sources,
they describe Catholic social teaching on this matter as follows:
"Material cooperation is only sometimes immoral. We judge this by a
kind of moral balancing test-weigh the importance of doing the act
against the gravity of the evil, its proximity, the certainty that one's act
will contribute to it, the danger of scandal to others, etc."' The
"judicial restraint" position of Justices Scalia and Thomas raises the
question: could federal judges ever be guilty of material cooperation
with evil by allowing an immoral law to go forward on the ground that it
is constitutional?
A judge will always have a very strong reason to stay on the case
even if adjudicating it under constitutional standards will mean affirm-
ing an immoral law. Society needs conscientious judges to serve; the
best women and men should not be prevented from handling our most
vexing legal problems. Even more clearly, there is probably never (or
perhaps almost never) any justification for a federal judge to remain on
a case and decide it contrary to proper legal or constitutional standards
in order to reach a result the judge believes is just. Preserving the rule
of law, and the limited role of unelected judges in a democracy, are very
important goals that, weighed in the balance, would almost always jus-
tify upholding a law that is constitutional although immoral.
Nevertheless, there are two ways in which a Supreme Court justice
might sometimes be seen as materially cooperating with evil in uphold-
ing an immoral law under constitutional standards. The first is if a jus-
tice acts publicly in a way that suggests the immoral law is not only con-
stitutional but also morally justified. A justice doing this would be
giving unnecessary support to the law, perhaps "causing scandal to oth-
ers" by persuading them of the law's goodness. Charles Black argued
that upholding a law always has the effect of giving it added moral le-
113. Id. at 319.
[Vol. 81:383
SOME RELIGIOUSLYDEVOUT JUSTICES
gitimacy.' 4 Such an argument is not really responsive to Scalia's and
Thomas's position, however, seems too broad, because it rests on the
premise that morality and constitutionality are closely related. If one
makes clear, as Justices Scalia and Thomas often do, that morality and
constitutionality are very different things, the inference that a law is
good because it passed judicial review should be undercut. Neverthe-
less, a judge could make statements in the course of upholding a law
that give the impression that the law is moral when it is not.
A second kind of argument might be that moral factors can and
should play a role in constitutional interpretation when the "limited
sources" of text and tradition cannot give definitive answers in particu-
lar cases. For example, as we noted above, the standard of "rationality"
under the Equal Protection Clause was agreed upon by all of the jus-
tices in Romer v. Evans, but different moral visions led to different
judgments about whether Amendment 2 was rational or spiteful. Simi-
larly, the question of whether a proceeding was "fundamentally fair,"
which all justices appear to agree is a requirement of the Due Process
Clause, often involves a moral judgment that cannot be wholly deter-
mined by tradition.
We mentioned above that in various situations, Justice Scalia and
Thomas have upheld, or probably would uphold, laws that traditionalist
values, or the teachings of the Church, would call deeply immoral: for
examples, laws that permit abortion or euthanasia. And they repeat-
edly have voted to let the imposition of death sentences go forward,
even though recent statements by the Pope (as well as by the recent
Catechism and by the American bishops) teach rather strongly that exe-
cuting offenders is inconsistent with the Church's position of respect for
human life unless such executions are limited to "case[s] of absolute ne-
cessity ... when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society,"
which the Pope describes as "very rare, if not practically non-
existent.'. 5 The wrongness of the death penalty is not as bedrock a
teaching as is the wrongness of abortion or euthanasia;..6 but one would
114. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1985).
115. JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LIFE (EVANGELIUM VITAE): THE EN-
CYCLICAL LETTER ON ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN TODAY'S
WORLD 100 (1995). For similar statements in the 1994 Catechism of the Catholic Church
and in a 1980 statement by the American Catholic bishops, see Garvey & Coney, supra note
112, at 308-15.
116. The Pope's condemnations of the death penalty are not made with the kind
of force found elsewhere in his encyclical in the condemnations of abortion and euthanasia.
See JOHN PAUL II, supra note 115, at 112, 119. The Pope's condemnations of abortion and
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still assume that devout Catholics must give very serious consideration
to the statements of the Pope and bishops taken together.117
Would upholding any of these laws mean a justice was materially
cooperating in a wrong? The claim that laws permitting abortion vio-
late the equal protection rights of the unborn is very untested, as is the
claim that laws permitting physician-assisted suicide violate the equal
protection rights of the terminally ill. One would assume that the
"limited sources" approach of Justices Scalia and Thomas would find
that these rights, however morally sound, had not been constitutional-
ized in the Equal Protection Clause. Although abortion and euthanasia
are very great wrongs under Catholic teaching, a justice who permitted
laws protecting these practices can convincingly say that he is bound by
history or tradition to interpret the Constitution that way, so that any
aid this gives to the practices is justified and is not material cooperation
with evil. If these justices were to face such a case and uphold the pro-
abortion or pro-euthanasia law, they could and probably would make
clear in their opinions that they were in no way stating that the law was
moral.
Similarly, it seems clear, under a "limited sources" approach, that
the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional; reference to the gov-
ernment taking life is found in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and capital punishment has historically been permitted on a
widespread basis. On that broad question, the sources of text and tradi-
tion are perhaps clear enough that moral arguments should not enter,
and a justice who rejects per se challenges to the death penalty is not
materially cooperating with evil.
However, we wonder if Justice Scalia has not gone beyond merely
holding the death penalty constitutional-if he has not given it more ac-
tive support in both of the ways identified above. Two cases from the
euthanasia use language "approaching that of infallible definitions." Avery Dulles, SJ., The
Gospel of Life: A Symposium, 56 FIRST THINGS 32 (Oct. 1995). Moreover, the condemna-
tion of the death penalty represents a doctrinal shift, for major Catholic teachers historically
gave it fairly broad endorsement. See Garvey & Coney, supra note 112, at 315-16. Thus
questions remain: What precisely are the exceptions to the almost but not quite absolute rule
against the death penalty? And is this one of the situations in which the statement is of such
a status that a faithful Catholic, including a public servant, is flatly prohibited from disa-
greeing or from acting to the contrary?
117. We also doubt that the current practice of capital punishment in America
comports with any reasonable reading of the papal statements. For further discussion, see
Garvey & Coney, supra note 112, at 311-17. It is worth noting the recent instances in which
the Pope has protested particular death sentences in America and appealed for clemency.
See, e.g., Richard Carelli, Court Hears Death Case that Drew Pop's Protest, Associated Press,
Mar. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL 4858033.
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1993-94 term illustrate the point.
First, we wonder if Justice Scalia has not sometimes rejected claims
by capital defendants in situations where moral arguments against the
death penalty could permissibly enter into constitutional interpretation.
Although the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional, a capital de-
fendant is obviously entitled in his individual case to due process, a con-
cept that includes certain irreducible elements of "fairness." In Sim-
mons v. South Carolina,"' Scalia and Thomas dissented from the
Court's ruling that when the prosecution suggests in the capital sen-
tencing phase that a defendant may pose a future threat to society, the
jury must be told of the alternative of imposing a life sentence without
parole. Neither the text nor the practices of the states clearly settles the
question, which simply seems to boil down to whether it is fair to let the
prosecution suggest future dangerousness without making sure the jury
is aware of an alternative to death that still would prevent such danger-
ousness. Justice Scalia appeared to bend over backward to read the re-
cord in a way that made the state's actions look fair.' 9 He also dis-
missed out of hand the idea that, due process might require a heightened
concern for fairness to the defendant when the state is seeking to im-
pose death."" In balancing the various considerations, we think that
Justice Scalia offered rather slim reasons in Simmons for excluding
from consideration moral factors such as the irrevocability of the death
penalty and the value of even a murderer's life.
We also wonder if Justice Scalia has not sometimes left the distinct
impression that the death penalty is morally justified, and not merely
within the people's power to enact. In Callins v. Collins,' for example,
Justice Blackmun, dissenting from the denial of a certiorari petition, ar-
gued that the death penalty was always cruel and unusual punishment
"as currently administered," and in the course of his opinion described
in detail what an execution by lethal injection is like." Justice Scalia re-
sponded with textual and historical arguments, but added that death by
lethal injection would be an "enviable" fate compared to what many
118. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
119. Justice Scalia argued that the jury probably relied on the heinousness of the
crime rather than future dangerousness in imposing death. Id at 181 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
However, the jury had imposed death only twenty-five minutes after asking the judge
whether parole was a possibility and receiving an ambiguous answer from the judge. Id. at
160.
120. Id. at 185 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing what he called the Court's
"'death-is-different' jurisprudence").
121. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).
122- Id. at 1159.
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convicted murderers have done--citing "the case of the 11-year-old girl
raped by four men and then killed by stuffing her panties down her
throat."' ' If the people "merely conclude that justice requires such bru-
tal deaths to be avenged by capital punishment," he said, the Court
should not stop them." Such appeals arguably go beyond defending the
death penalty's constitutionality and rather seek to make an affirmative
case for it-indeed, a case based on considerations of vengeance that
are entirely at odds with the approach of official Roman Catholic
teaching.'2
IV. CONCLUSION
There are many areas to explore within the broad subject of the jus-
tices' religious beliefs: religion in the appointment process, the distinc-
tive positions of justices from religious minorities (Catholics and Jews),
a more exhaustive look at the effect of the justices' religious views on
church-state rulings. In this paper, we have sought to offer a taste of the
subject, and of its historical nature, by looking at "devout" justices from
three periods in the Court's history in which religious identities were
important. The relationship of religious ideals and judicial decisions has
varied in each of those periods. In the late nineteenth century, a perva-
sive Protestant identity equated religious and constitutional ideals; this
meant that widely shared religious views would generally affect deci-
sions, sometimes but not often with explicit recognition of religious ar-
guments. The New Deal's Justice Murphy also equated constitutional
ideals with his distinctive version of Roman Catholic ideals, but he did
not mention religion in his opinions, perhaps because conventions had
by then turned against such references. On the current Court, the dis-
tinctive situation is that the most publicly "devout" justices, Scalia and
Thomas, most strongly reject independent moral (and hence religious)
reasoning in interpreting the law-although their methods of interpre-
tation do allow for substantial reference to traditional religious views
and produce results largely in harmony with them. Our overarching les-
123. Id. at 1143 (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of certiorari petition) (citing
McCollum v. North Carolina, cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254 (1994)).
124. Id.
125. One might defend Justice Scalia, on the other hand, by pointing out that even
if a law is not within the specific prohibitions of the Constitution, it must pass a minimal due
process or equal protection review for rationality, which requires at least some minimal de-
fense of the law on its merits.
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son is that this topic must be approached historically, with all the com-
plexities of history: religion and law have interacted in different ways in
the work of justices of different eras.

